Abstract. The rst-order temporal logics with 2 and of time structures isomorphic to ! (discrete linear time) and trees of !-segments (linear time with branching gaps) and some of its fragments are compared: The rst is not recursively axiomatizable. For the second, a cut-free complete sequent calculus is given, and from this, a resolution system is derived by the method of Maslov.
Introduction
In recent years, various temporal logics have been studied and applied to the description and analysis of dynamic properties of programs 7] . The investigations have focussed on discrete, linearly ordered, well-founded temporal structures because temporal states can then be identi ed with program states. It turns out that the rst-order logics corresponding to this semantics are not recursively axiomatizable if 2 (henceforth always) and (nexttime) are present in the language: It is possible to characterize the set of natural numbers by :2:U(x), where U(x) holds for exactly one domain element at each state and is determined by a recursion in (see 8] ). This incompleteness result is based on a standard model of linear time; if similarity types are allowed , one can obtain completeness results for rst order temporal logic relative to classes of models of linear time (see 1]). With a change in the semantics (branching time gaps), however, a complete rst-order logic can be obtained; this is the subject of the present paper. Our proof of completeness can be carried over to several types of future-oriented temporal operators (see 8]); there may be problems however if future-and past-oriented operators are present simultaneously.
For simplicity, we consider here only languages with 2 and as the only temporal operators, and constants as the only function symbols. We compare the logic The semantics considered here is usually called initial semantics. Normal semantics is de ned via truth in all states, not only in K 0 . We will need the following lemma later on:
Lemma 2.5. Let A be a formula.
(1) j = A i A is true in every world in every temporal structure. Remark 2.6. The logics we consider di er from the ones in the literature in that we do not use global and local variables, but the interpretation of predicate symbols can vary over the states. This is more in keeping with the tradition in quanti cational modal logics. However, by using the Barcan formulas for 2 and , de nable twosortedness and other expressible concepts, most e ects of global and local variables can be simulated. Another minor di erence is in the de nition of 2: Kr oger's 2 is de ned via truth in all later worlds; in Kr oger's logic, our 2 can be de ned by 2A^A, his 2 can be expressed by 2A in TL.
As indicated in the introduction, the logic TL is not axiomatizable. This was shown for the original formulation of Kr oger by Szalas 12] Let 0 designate the successor function, and the constant 0 the number zero. Consider the formula axiomatizing the predicate U, U(0)^2(8x) U(x) (9y)
? y = x 0^ U(y) ^2(8x)(8y) ? U(x)^U(y) x = y :
In every model, 3U(x) represents exactly the set of natural numbers. If the language is expressive enough, we can write down the usual axioms for addition and multiplication (e.g., Robinson's Q). A sentence of arithmetic is true in the natural numbers i its relativization to 3U(x) follows in TL from these axioms. The non-axiomatizability of TL thus follows from G odel's Incompleteness Theorems.
A Sequent Calculus for TB
In the standard de nition a sequent is an expression of the form A 1 ; : : :; A k ! B 1 ; : : :; Bẁ here the A i and B j are rst-order formulas. For the purpose of completeness proofs it is more convenient to use instead in nite sequents (see, e.g., Takeuti's book 14, Ch. 1.8]). More precisely, the completeness theorem requires a generalization of nite sequences of formulas to countably in nite well-ordered sequences. We will use this more general notion of sequents and indicate the use of nite sequents explicitly.
Let be a countable (possibly nite) well-ordered sequence. If is order isomorphic to the well-ordered set of numbers via a mapping s. It is only a matter of convention that we use the term \provable" for in nite sequents, as LB works only on nite sequents. This convention is, however, of essential advantage in completeness proofs. In our completeness proof we do not need the semantics of in nite sequents; particularly we do not speak about (semantic) compactness (i.e. about the property that an in nite sequent is valid i there exists a nite subsequent which is valid). Note that, on the right branch of the proof, we introduced 2A twice on the lefthand side of a sequent. This is necessary because of the way (nex) introduces in all formulas of the sequent. Theorem 3.7. LB is sound for TB, i.e., every nite LB-provable sequent is valid in TB. Proof. It is su cient to prove the soundness of the LB-rules. The soundness of the LK-part is proved as usual. The soundness of the rules 2:left and 2:right follows from the \recursion" equivalence of 2A and 2A^A in the TB-semantics. The soundness of (nex) follows from Lemma 2.5(3) and from the fact that distributes over the propositional connectives (e.g., (A^B) is equivalent to A^ B). The soundness of (nec) follows from Lemma 2.5(2), from the TB-equivalence of 2A and 22A, from the distributivity of 2 over^, and from the fact that 2(A B) implies 2A 2B. 2
If we look closely at the rules of LB we notice that (2:left) and (2:right) are not strictly analytical. Therefore it is convenient to extend the usual notion of subformula. Note that we have disjoint sets of free and bound variables. A term is de ned as usual but subject to the restriction that it may only contain free variables; if also bound variables are allowed to occur we speak about semi-terms. Similarly we distinguish between formulas and semi-formulas. The concept of strict sub-semi-formula represents the intuitive notion of subformula, while the de nition of semi-formulas takes care about the nonanalytic behaviour of and 2.
De nition 3.8. Let F be a formula. The set ssf(F) of strict sub-semi-formulas of F is de ned as ssf(F) = fFg (F), where By sub (F) we denote the set of formulas obtained from sub(F) by replacing bound variables without matching quanti er in each member of sub(F) by free variables or constant symbols (i.e., we obtain actual subformulas corresponding to the semiformulas).
Completeness of LB
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. LB is complete for TB: Every nite TB-valid sequent S has a cutfree LB-proof from atomic axioms.
The proof requires some additional de nitions and technical lemmata. In order to emphasize the main lines of the argument we give a rough sketch of the proof in advance:
The proof uses a variant of Sch utte's method of reduction trees as modi ed for intuitionistic logic with Kripke semantics by 14, Ch. Note that our sequents may be in nite and thus there may be in nitely many free variables even on a nite branch. Since in the de nition of R k+1 there may be nodes of uncountable degree we need an uncountable supply of free variables (note that this poses no problem, as R(S) is a semantic structure and not an actual proof tree). Constants occurring in S (by construction no new constants are generated) are treated like available variables. The reduction applies to any top sequent (i.e., leaf sequent) of R k . The method is a generalization of the rst-order case (which applies to :,^, _, , 8, 9) by extending it to the case of 2. For the time being, we postpone treatment of . Concerning formulas with outermost logical symbols among :,^, _, , 8, 9 we proceed as in 14]. We present only some typical cases and omit most of the details. The principle is that of decomposing formulas according to their outermost logical symbol. In order to avoid reducing formulas more often than needed, we mark formulas as \treated" once the reduction has been applied to them.
In the rst step the root sequent contains only unmarked formulas. So let us assume that S 0 : ! is a leaf node of a branch B in R k .
(a1) Outermost logical symbol^(left reduction) Let (A i^Bi ) i2 be the subsequence of consisting of unmarked formulas with outermost logical symbol^. Then we de ne S 00 : (A i ; B i ) i2 ; ! and add the edge (S 0 ; S 00 ) to R k . Mark the thus reduced formulas (A i^Bi ) i2 in S 00 . (a2) Outermost logical symbol^(right reduction):
Here let (A i^Bi ) i2 be the subsequence of consisting of all unmarked formulas with outermost logical symbol^. Let (S 0 ) = f ! ; (C i ) i2 j C i = A i or C i = B i g. For every S 00 2 (S 0 ) add S 00 and the edge (S 0 ; S 00 ) to R k and mark the formulas (A i^Bi ) i2 therein. Note that the node S 0 has an uncountable degree in the new tree R k+1 if is an in nite ordinal. We skip the de nition for the other propositional connectives and refer the reader to 14]. By the above construction we obtain an (in nite) sequence of trees which is monotonic. Thus, by taking the union over the sets of vertices and edges, we obtain the limit tree R ! . R ! is precisely the tree R(S) we intended to construct.
Note that our construction, if applied to formulas neither containing nor 2, yields the familiar construction of a counterexample in classical predicate logic. Indeed, if A is such a formula which is not valid (in the standard rst-order semantics) we obtain an in nite open branch B representing a counterexample. Our construction, however, is not completed so far. In fact, we may obtain open branches in R(S) even for sequents valid in TB. Note that in the construction of R(S) itself we cannot obtain in nite sequents provided the root sequent is nite. But in some further constructions we will obtain in nite sequents out of in nite branches and apply the method of reduction trees to these sequents as well. Let us illustrate the construction of R(S) by a simple example (cf. also Example 3. In the case of LK, nite sequents, and an unprovable end-sequent S we obtain a tree R(S) with the following property: If S 0 is an unprovable sequent in R(S), then there is a successor of S 0 in R(S) which is also unprovable. As R(S) must be in nite and its node degree nite, there is an in nite branch by K onig's Lemma. This in nite branch consist of unprovable sequents only and represents a counterexample. This argument obviously yields the completeness of LK.
In the case of in nite sequents S there may be nodes in R(S) of uncountable degree. This phenomenon occurs if, in a sequent S 0 occurring in R(S), we have in nitely many formulas containing an outermost logical operator with a binary reduction rule (e.g., (^:right) or (2:right)). It is, however, still possible to prove the existence of an in nite branch containing unprovable sequents. For this purpose we will use a generalization of K onig's Lemma due to Takeuti 14] .
De nition 4.4. Let be a set and fW i g i2 be a family of sets indexed by . Theorem 4.5. (Takeuti 14] , p. 51f) Let be a set and fW i g i2 be a family of nite sets. Let P be a property of partial functions over s. Using trans nite induction on trees (by ordering trees according to the standard subset relation) we derive from (*): If S is unprovable, then there exists an innite reduction branch in R(S) (every maximal nite branch must end in a provable sequent). Thus, by (*), every path leading to an unprovable sequent can be extended). Note again that the degree of some nodes in R(S) may be uncountable, but branches in R(S) are always countable! Thus it remains to prove (*): Case 1: S 0 is of degree 1: The rule used for the reduction of S 0 has only one premise, e.g., (_:right), (9:left), (2:left). Then S 0 has only one successor S 00 . Let us assume that S 00 is provable. By de nition of provability (of in nite sequents) there exists a nite subsequent S 00 0 of S 00 which is provable too. Now let B 1 , : : :, B m be the formulas in S 00 0 obtained by reduction using some rule (let us call it ). Then, by repeated application of on the B i combined with contractions and exchanges, we obtain a nite subsequent S 0 0 of S 0 which is provable too; the proof of S 00 0 can be easily extended to a proof of S 0 0 . Case 2: S 0 is of degree > 1 (possibly of uncountable degree): The rule corresponding the reduction of this node must be binary , e.g., (_:left), (2:right). By de nition of a reduction tree the successors of S 0 must be of the form ! ; (C ji;i ) i2 or (C ji;i ) i2 ; ! where for all i 2 we have j i 2 f0; 1g depending on which (of the two) subformulas occurs on position i. Moreover, for every sequence (j i ) i2 there exists a successor corresponding to this sequence. In the argument to follow it does not matter whether the rule under consideration is a left or a right rule. Thus, we restrict attention to the case where is a right rule and the reduced sequent is ! ; (C ji;i ) i2 . Now let W i = f0; 1g for every i 2 and f denote functions in Q i2 W i (= f0; 1g ). Let us assume that all successors of S 0 are provable. Then to every successor S 00 of S 0 there corresponds exactly one f 2 f0; 1g . Thus if S 00 corresponds to f we write S 00 = S 00 f]. Since S 00 f] is provable there exists a nite subsequent S 00 0 f] of S 00 f] which is provable too. This means, for every total f (see De nition 4.4) there is a nite subsequent S 00 0 f] of S 00 f] s.t. S 00 0 f] is provable. Hence, for S 0 = ! ; (C ji;i ) i2 and every f 2 f0; 1g we obtain a nite provable subsequent S 00 0 f] of the form f ! f ; (C ji;i ) i2 1 where 1 is a nite subset of .
Let 1 = fi 1 ; : : :; i n g be an arbitrary nite subset of and let f 2 f0; 1g 1 .
Then we call the nite sequence of formulas ? C f(i1);i1 ; : : :; C f(in);in selected for f if there are nite subsequences f , f of , , respectively, s.t. f ! f ; (C f(i);i ) i2 1 is provable. By the explications above, there are such subsequences for every f. Hence, there exist selected sequences for every total f.
In order to apply Takeuti's theorem we have to de ne a property P of partial functions over R. We choose: P(f) () (9n 2 !)(9i 1 ; : : :; i n 2 domf)(C f(i1);i1 ; : : :; C f(in);in ) is selected P(f) obviously satis es both conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 4.5. Thus, Takeuti's theorem applies and there exists a nite set 0 = fr 1 ; : : :; r`g s.t. if 0 domf then P(f) holds. We de ne F = ff j domf = 0 g Then F is a nite set and P(f) holds for all f 2 F. But this means that for every f 2 F there exists s 1 , : : :, s k 2 R 0 (= domf) s.t.
? C f(s1);s1 ; : : :; C f(sk);sk is selected, i.e., there exists a nite subsequence f ; f of ; s.t.
f ! f ; C f(s1);s1 ; : : :; C f(sk);sk is provable. Now the set f0; 1g 0 is isomorphic to f0; 1g f1;:::;`g , the set of all binary sequences of length`. Thus for every such binary sequence = (i 1 ; : : :; i`) there exist nite subsequences ; of ; s.t. S : ! ; C i1;r1 ; : : :; C i`;rì s provable. We see that the C i1;r1 , : : :, C i`;r`f or (i 1 ; : : :; i`) 2 f0; 1g f1;:::;`g (= B`) are exactly the reduction formulas obtained from the reduction of the nite subsequent S 0 0 : 0 ! 0 ; C r1 ; : : :; C r`w here 0 is the union sequence of ( ) 2Bà nd 0 is the union sequence of ( ) 2B`. By repeated application of the binary rule under consideration we can derive S 0 0 from the sequents S . Together with the respective LB-proofs of the S we obtain a proof of S 0 0 . But S 0 0 is a nite subsequence of S 0 and thus S 0 is provable. 2 Note that in order to prove lemma 4.6 we made use of the compactness of the provability concept (which holds by de nition). We did not use (semantic) compactness of the logic TB and do not even claim that TB is indeed compact.
So far we know that for unprovable sequents S, there must be an in nite branch containing only unprovable sequents (i.e., a reduction branch) in R(S). In our next step we \pass" the ordinal ! in our construction and obtain in nite sequents out of nite ones (note that, if S is nite, then R(S) contains only nite sequents). The basic idea is to construct (in nite) unprovable sequents out of reduction branches and iterate this procedure in nitely often. Lemma 4.8. Let S be an unprovable sequent and B be a reduction branch in R(S) and let S 0 be the successor of S w.r.t. B. Then S 0 is unprovable.
Remark 4.9. By lemma 4.6 we know that R(S) must have a reduction branch; thus the assumption of the lemma can always be ful lled and S 0 exists.
Proof The sequents in a next-time sequence represent necessary conditions for a sequent S to be true: If S is true at time point 0, then S 1 is true at point 1, S 2 at 2, etc. But these conditions are not su cient. Let us look at the sequent S 1 : 2 A ! 2A. We know that S 1 is not TB-valid. Let us assume that S 1 is true at time point 1. Then the sequent S 2 : A; 2 A ! 2A is true at time point 2 and at time k we would have A; 2 A ! 2A being true. According to our semantics there is a counterexample to the sequent S 2 at every time point k 2 !. But recall that at time point ! we may set A to false. Note that ! is not a successor ordinal. Thus in order to construct counterexamples to sequents we have to \jump" across time gaps; this jump will be performed via reverse application of the necessitation rule.
De nition 4.12. Let S be an unprovable sequent. A gapjump tree G(S) for S is a tree with nodes consisting of next-time sequences satisfying the following conditions: (1) The root of G(S) is a next-time sequence of S. Lemma 4.14. Let N be a node in a gapjump tree G(S 0 ) for unprovable S 0 and S We have to show that nite unprovable sequents are not valid. More precisely, if S is a nite sequent which is unprovable in LB, then there exists a TB-interpretation K for S which falsi es S.
Let G(S) be a gapjump tree for S. We de ne the following TB-interpretation K = hT; fD B g B2T ; fS B g B2T i where We have to show that this truth assignment is consistent, i.e., that it is impossible that an atomic formula A occurs in an antecedent and in a consequent of a sequent in B. Thus let B = (S i ) i2! . By construction of a reduction tree we have sub (S i ) sub (S j ) for i < j (see de nition 3.8). In particular, all atomic formulas occurring in the antecedent (consequent) of S i also occur in the antecedent (consequent) of S j . Thus if A occurs in the antecedent of S i and in the consequent of S j it must occur in both sides in S k for k max(i; j). This, however, contradicts the de nition of reduction branches in a reduction tree (De nition 4.2), as B would be closed. So S B is consistently de ned.
It remains to show that K, as de ned above, is indeed a countermodel to S. (4), a proof has to be found before jumping over the rst gap i one exists. 2
In contrast to (3) above, the monadic fragment of TB without 2 (and hence, by (5), the fragment of TL without 2) is decidable: Proposition 5.2. It is decidable if a monadic temporal formula containing no 2's is satis able.
Proof. Note that distributes over all propositional connectives. Hence, any formula F containing no 2's is equivalent to a formula of the form W j K j where
where L i j;k is a negated or unnegated atomic formula. F is satis able i K j is satis able for some j. Consider the set ?(K) = ? 1 (K) ? 2 (K) with
where t k are constant symbols, and v L i;k (t l ) is considered as a propositional literal L v i;k;l : K is satis able i ?(K) is satis able in classical propositional logic. 2 So already the monadic fragments containing 2 but not are undecidable. It is worth to recapitulate the construction of the proof of Kripke 6] : A binary predicate P(x; y) can be encoded in monadic temporal logic as P 0 (x; y) = 3(P 1 (x)P 2 (y)). Let F be a formula in the language of predicate logic, and F 0 be obtained from it by replacing n-ary predicates P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) by 3(P 1 (x 1 )^: : :^P n (x n )). If F is valid, then F 0 is too, it being a substitution instance of F. If F is not valid, then we construct a temporal countermodel for F 0 : Let M be a ( rst-order) structure in which F is not satis ed. By the L owenheim-Skolem Theorem, we can assume M to be countable. We can enumerate all n-tuples of elements of the domain M using a function e. Let T be !, and S j (P i ) = fag i a is the i-th component of the j-th (in e) n-tuple of M. So 3(P 1 (a 1 )^: : :^P n (a n )) is true in h!; fD i = Mg i2! ; fS i g i2! i i M j = P(a 1 ; : : :; a n ).
As remarked above, the undecidability of the monadic fragments of TL and TB follows from the undecidability of dyadic predicate logic and the above construction. We have two immediate consequences: First, the monadic fragment of TL (with ) is not even axiomatizable, since we can replace the function symbols 0, 0 , +, by (a unary, a binary, and two ternary) predicate symbols. These predicate symbols can in turn be replaced by temporal constructions of the kind used above; so non-axiomatizability follows from the non-axiomatizability of the full logic (see Section 2). A second interesting consequence is that already the fragment with only one monadic predicate symbol (but including ) is undecidable: With some adjustment to the construction of the countermodel in the proof above, a binary predicate can also be encoded by 3(P(x)^ P(y)). We do not know, however, whether the A practical consequence of the cut-free completeness of LB is the ability to construct a resolution calculus. The exact relationship between cut-free proofs in sequent calculus and resolution proofs has been investigated at length by Mints 10, 11] . This relationship is also the starting point for very fruitful investigations into resolution systems and strategies for other non-classical logics, e.g., linear logic (see 15]).
The resolution procedure for TB works as follows: The formula F to be proved (:F to be refuted) is translated to clause form via translation rules based on the calculus LB. The translation is structure preserving, and the literals have the form (:) A] ](a 1 ; : : :; a n ), where A is the sub-semi-formula corresponding to this literal, and a 1 , : : :, a n are free variables or constant symbols. A clause is an expression of the form C, where C is a set of literals. A clause may carry a variable restriction, denoted C a , meaning that a resolution involving C is only allowed if a does not occur in the resulting clause and if a is not substituted into. The rules are the resolution and factoring rules, plus two rules corresponding to the (nec) and (nex) rules. By Lemma 2.5 and replacement of free variables with constant symbols, we can assume that F is closed and does not start with 2 or .
De nition 6.1. Let F be a semi-formula, and let 1 , : : :, n be all the constant symbols and bound variables without matching quanti er in order of occurrence. The application of the rules (nex r ) and (nec r ) is restricted so that the resulting literals are still within sub(F). The calculus, therefore, depends on F; we actually are giving a construction schema for resolution calculi for each F. The following should be noted about the variable restriction: Proposition 6.3. In any resolution inference, Example 6.5 . By contrast, consider the formula F = P(f) (8x)P(x), which is not valid. Without the eigenvariable condition, we would have the following derivation of the empty clause:
For the resolution step (res ) to work, either (a) = b, or (b) = a. The former case is expressly forbidden, in the latter case the restricted variable would appear in the resulting clause. Theorem 6.6. The resolution calculus for TB is sound: If ; is derivable from Cl(F), then j = F.
Proof. We show how a resolution derivation not using the goal clause f: F] ]g can be translated to an LB-derivation. Associate to each clause C in the substitution C = , where is the original renaming of the bound variables and constants in subsemiformulas of F whose code occurs in C, and is the cumulative substitution of the subderivation in ending in C. In e ect, if A( In fact, a formula :F has a refutation without degree restriction i j = 3F, but j = 3F is not equivalent to j = F (in contrast to 2 and ; cf. Lemma 2.5). Theorem 6.8. The resolution calculus for TB is complete: If j = F, then ; is derivable from Cl(F).
Proof. We give, for each LB-proof of a sequent ! F, a resolution proof of ; from Cl(F). By Theorem 4.1, we can assume that is cut-free, analytic, that its axioms are atomic, and by Proposition 3.5 that it contains no weakenings. Let ! be a sequent in . As can easily be seen, a formula A occurs positively (negatively) in ! i it occurs positively (negatively) in F. Furthermore, every formula A in corresponds to exactly one sub-semi-formula A 0 of F, which can be determined by tracing the formula A downwards through . We translate to a resolution proof of f F] ]g by induction on its subproofs 0 : If 0 ends in ! , then 0 ends in :N P , where the semi-formulas whose codes occur in 0 0 are those sub-semi-formulas of F corresponding to the formulas in ! . There is no variable restriction on the last clause in 0 . We present here some cases:
(1) 0 is an axiom:
Translate P( a) ! P( a) to a clause f: P( )] ]( a); P( )] ]( a)g, where P( ) (P( )) is the sub-semi-formula of F corresponding to the left (right) P( a). (This clause is in Ax(F ).) (2) Append a (nec r ) inference to the resolution proof to obtain 0 .
Note that in the translation to resolution, the restriction on the rules are all satis ed. The uni ers can be chosen so that only the variables in the clauses from Cl(F) are substituted into. Given a proof of ! F we thus have a resolution proof of f F] ]g from clauses in Cl(F). By resolving with f: F] ]g 2 Cl(F), we obtain ;. 2 The translation above shows actually that a re nement of resolution is complete, namely where every resolution step has to involve at least one input clause, i.e., a clause form Cl(F). The resolution method developed here di ers signi cantly from the resolution method of Robinson developed for classical clause logic, hence the fact that \input resolution" is complete is not a contradiction to the well-known fact that input resolution in the classical case is not complete.
Conclusion
We have seen how the passage from a non-axiomatizable temporal semantics to an axiomatizable one is paralleled by an extension of the completeness proof of the propositional logic. The point where the proof fails for TL is where a true formula starting with 2 is reduced, even in nitely often, but no derivation can be obtained. The extension of the semantics is prompted by this phenomenon, and makes a complete reduction of the formula possible. The reduction discussed here is very similar to Kr oger's completeness proof for propositional TL. This prompts the question of how to extend similar propositional completeness proofs to the rst-order case by avoiding non-axiomatizability of the standard semantics by extension of the semantics itself. A candidate for such investigations would be, e.g., in nite-valued Lukasiewicz logic. It also prompts the question for a characterization of classes of formulas, where a sequent calculus is complete for the original semantics, say, as those formulas where the reduction works.
It is quite natural to ask, whether the predicate logic of linear time with gaps (the structures being sequences of !-segments) is axiomatizable or not; let us call this logic TLG. Indeed even the pure 2-part of TLG is not axiomatizable. This result can be obtained by reducing the problem to the nonaxiomatizability of the in nite-valued G odel logic with truth values from the set f 1 n jn 2 N ? f0gg f0g.
However the proof of this result is quite involved, placing it outside the scope of this paper. It will be presented elsewhere.
Another problem which has not been addressed in depth so far is the correspondence between temporal logics discussed here, and number theory. The proof of non-axiomatizability of TL by reduction to arithmetic, and the \induction" rule of propositional TL suggest that there is a close relation. This suggestion is supported by our result: the semantics of TB is a \non-standard" semantics, similar to non-standard models of arithmetic. Viewed this way, it is not as surprising that TB would have a complete axiomatization.
